# OpenAI 为高级 Codex 用户推出了可复用、可继承的权限配置文件，替代粗粒度沙箱模式，实现基于操作系统强制规则的最小权限控制 - 来源：Tibo Sottiaux - 发布时间：2026-06-30 00:45 - AIWatch 分数：66 - AIWatch 标记：当日精选 - AIWatch 链接：https://aiwatch.icu/events/evt_01kwa5xkxrgwan0tkarndc7ckz - 原文链接：https://x.com/thsottiaux/status/2071636285807059315 ## 精选理由 高信息密度，值得细读 ## AI 摘要 OpenAI 为高级 Codex 用户推出了可复用、可继承的权限配置文件，替代了粗粒度的沙箱模式。该配置绑定操作系统强制规则（如文件读/写/拒绝，甚至支持 **/*.env 模式），并针对每个域和 Unix 套接字进行网络权限控制。此外，还提供了故障关闭的管理员允许列表，实现了每个任务的最小权限控制。这对开发者意味着更精细、更安全的代码执行环境。 核心观点： 1. 权限配置文件支持继承，可复用且绑定 OS 强制规则，实现比粗粒度沙箱更细粒度的控制。 2. 支持 **/*.env 等文件模式，以及按域和 Unix 套接字的网络权限控制。 3. 提供故障关闭的管理员允许列表，确保最小权限原则。 ## 正文 Beta. Permission profiles are under active development and may change. Permission profiles do not compose with the older sandbox settings. Configure either default_permissions and [permissions], or sandbox_mode / sandbox_workspace_write, but not both. If sandbox_mode appears in any loaded config file, you pass --sandbox, or the selected config profile sets sandbox_mode, Codex uses those older sandbox settings instead of default_permissions.Managed allowed_permission_profiles is the exception: it makes Codex use permission profiles. Remove older settings such as sandbox_mode and [sandbox_workspace_write] before deploying a managed profile allowlist. For a mixed-version enterprise rollout, you can keep the managed allowed_sandbox_modes requirement as a temporary compatibility constraint until every client runs Codex 0.138.0 or later. Permission profiles let you apply least-privilege boundaries to local commands Codex runs on your behalf. A profile is a named policy that combines filesystem rules, which define what commands can read or write, with network rules, which define which destinations commands can reach. Use profiles to give Codex enough access for the current task without granting broad access to your machine or network. For example, a read-only profile can let Codex inspect a project without editing it, while a write-capable profile can limit edits to selected workspace roots. Local permission profiles are supported on macOS, Linux, WSL, and native Windows. See Scope and enforcement for platform-specific details and caveats. For Codex cloud network settings, see Internet Access. Codex includes three built-in permission profiles: :read-only keeps local command execution read-only. :workspace allows writes inside the active workspace roots and system temp directories. :danger-full-access removes local sandbox restrictions and should be used only when that broad access is intentional. Create a named profile under [permissions.], then set the top-level default_permissions key to that profile name or to one of the built-ins above. In this example, project-edit is a user-defined profile name, not a built-in value. Enterprise administrators can define profiles and restrict which profiles users may select through managed requirements.toml. Once allowed_permission_profiles is present, omitted profiles are denied, including omitted built-ins and profiles added in future Codex versions. See Control available permission profiles for the recommended managed configuration. Custom profiles use two related concepts: [permissions..workspace_roots] adds concrete directories that should count as workspace roots for that profile. [permissions..filesystem.":workspace_roots"] defines the filesystem rules Codex applies inside every effective workspace root: the current session’s runtime workspace roots plus the profile-defined roots above. Profiles also use the normal config-layer model. Higher-precedence layers can add or replace entries under the same profile name without restating the whole profile. For example, an organization-level config and a user-level config can extend the same profile independently: # /etc/codex/config.toml [permissions.server.workspace_roots] "~/code/server" = true # ~/.codex/config.toml [permissions.server.workspace_roots] "~/code/mobile-app" = true When server is active, both workspace roots participate in the effective profile. default_permissions = "project-edit" [permissions.project-edit.workspace_roots] "~/code/app" = true "~/code/shared-lib" = true [permissions.project-edit.filesystem] ":minimal" = "read" [permissions.project-edit.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] "." = "write" ".devcontainer" = "read" "**/*.env" = "deny" [permissions.project-edit.network] enabled = true [permissions.project-edit.network.domains] "api.openai.com" = "allow" "objects.githubusercontent.com" = "allow" "*.github.com" = "allow" "tracking.example.com" = "deny" This profile: Reads the minimal runtime paths common developer tools need. Applies the same workspace-root rules to the current session and the profile-defined roots. Keeps IDE-adjacent settings such as .devcontainer/ read-only under each root. Denies matching environment files with a glob rule. Allows network access only through the configured domain policy. Inside an active profile, narrower deny rules stay in force even when a broader path is readable or writable. For example, a profile can make workspace roots writable while still setting a matching .env path to deny. Use extends when a profile is mostly the same as a built-in or another named profile. Prefer extending a built-in profile over starting from scratch so baseline protections carry forward. Extending :workspace, for example, keeps the workspace root’s .codex directory read-only unless you explicitly override it. Set the parent once, then add or override only the rules that differ. default_permissions = "project-edit" [permissions.project-edit] description = "Project editing with OpenAI API access." extends = ":workspace" [permissions.project-edit.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] "**/*.env" = "deny" [permissions.project-edit.network] enabled = true [permissions.project-edit.network.domains] "api.openai.com" = "allow" This profile starts with :workspace, keeps matching .env files denied, and allows requests to api.openai.com. A profile can extend :read-only, :workspace, or another named profile. It cannot extend :danger-full-access; Codex also rejects unknown parents and inheritance cycles. EntryType / valuesDefaultDetailsdefault_permissionsString profile nameNoneNames the permissions profile Codex applies by default. It must match a profile under [permissions] or a built-in such as :workspace. Set it explicitly for predictable behavior; managed requirements may omit it only when both :workspace and :read-only are explicitly allowed. Codex uses older sandbox settings unless managed allowed_permission_profiles tells it to use permission profiles in this setup.[permissions.]TableNoneDefines a named profile. default_permissions selects one profile as the default; other permission-profile settings also use the profile name.permissions..descriptionStringNoneProvides a human-readable description for the profile. A profile does not inherit its parent’s description through extends.permissions..extendsString profile nameNoneStarts this profile from another named profile or the built-in :read-only or :workspace profile. Codex rejects :danger-full-access, unknown parents, and inheritance cycles.[permissions..workspace_roots]TableNoneAdds profile-defined workspace roots that receive :workspace_roots filesystem rules alongside the current session’s runtime workspace roots.permissions..workspace_roots.""BooleanfalseAdds the path to the profile’s workspace root set when true. Entries set to false remain inactive.[permissions..filesystem]TableNoneMaps filesystem paths to access values or scoped subpath maps. Missing or empty filesystem tables keep filesystem access restricted and emit a startup warning.permissions..filesystem.glob_scan_max_depthNumberNoneLimits deny-read glob expansion on Linux, WSL, and native Windows when Codex snapshots matches before sandbox startup. Larger values can increase startup scanning work. Use a value of at least 1 when an unbounded ** pattern needs bounded pre-expansion.[permissions..filesystem].""read, write, or denyNoneGrants direct access for a supported path. deny denies access and wins over equally specific write or read entries. Codex rejects direct write rules that the active runtime cannot enforce.[permissions..filesystem.""].""read, write, or denyNoneGrants access to a descendant of . Use . for the base path. Other subpaths must be relative descendants and cannot contain . or .. components.[permissions..network]TableNoneConfigures the network sandbox proxy and the sandbox network policy for the profile.permissions..network.enabledBooleanfalseEnables network access for sandboxed commands in the profile. This changes the sandbox network policy; it does not start the network proxy by itself.[permissions..network.domains]TableNoneMaps host patterns to allow or deny. If there are no allow entries, domain requests are blocked. Deny entries override allow entries.permissions..network.domains.""allow or denyNoneSupports exact hosts, *.example.com for subdomains, **.example.com for apex plus subdomains, and * as an allow-only global wildcard. Host patterns are normalized by trimming, lowercasing, stripping a trailing dot, and stripping simple ports or brackets.[permissions..network.unix_sockets]TableNoneMaps Unix socket allowlist overrides. Use only for local integrations such as Docker.permissions..network.unix_sockets.""allow or denyNoneAdds an absolute Unix socket path to the effective allowlist with allow, or rejects it with deny. Denied entries are omitted from the effective allowlist.permissions..network.proxy_urlURL stringhttp://127.0.0.1:3128HTTP proxy listener used for HTTP_PROXY, HTTPS_PROXY, websocket proxy variables, and related tool proxy environment variables.permissions..network.enable_socks5BooleantrueEnables the SOCKS5 listener used for ALL_PROXY and FTP proxy variables.permissions..network.socks_urlURL stringhttp://127.0.0.1:8081SOCKS5 listener address.permissions..network.enable_socks5_udpBooleantrueEnables SOCKS5 UDP support when the SOCKS5 listener is enabled.permissions..network.allow_upstream_proxyBooleantrueAllows the network sandbox proxy to respect upstream HTTP(S)_PROXY and ALL_PROXY settings for outbound requests.permissions..network.allow_local_bindingBooleanfalseDisables the local/private-network guard when true. When false, exact local literals such as localhost or 127.0.0.1 must be explicitly allowlisted, and hostnames that resolve to local or private IPs remain blocked.permissions..network.dangerously_allow_non_loopback_proxyBooleanfalseAllows proxy listeners to bind non-loopback addresses. Leave unset for ordinary local development.permissions..network.dangerously_allow_all_unix_socketsBooleanfalseBypasses the Unix socket allowlist where Unix socket proxying is supported. This is a broad local escape hatch. Filesystem entries use read, write, or deny: AccessMeaningreadAllows commands to read files and list directories under the path. Commands cannot create, modify, rename, or delete files there.writeAllows commands to read and modify files under the path, including creating, renaming, and deleting files when the OS allows it.denyDenies both reads and writes under the path. Use it to carve out a denied subpath from a broader read or write grant. More specific entries override broader entries. When two entries target the same path, deny takes precedence over write, and write takes precedence over read. This precedence lets a profile describe a broad working area first, then carve out files or directories that should stay unreadable: [permissions.project-edit.filesystem] ":minimal" = "read" [permissions.project-edit.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] "." = "write" ".devcontainer" = "read" "**/*.env" = "deny" In this example, the workspace root stays writable, .devcontainer/ stays readable without becoming writable, and matching environment files remain unavailable to sandboxed commands. A more specific path can also reopen a narrower subtree inside a broader deny: [permissions.project-edit.filesystem] "~/Documents" = "deny" "~/Documents/codex" = "write" Supported path forms: PathMeaningScoped subpaths:rootThe filesystem root. only:minimalPlatform and runtime paths needed by common tools. only:workspace_rootsThe current session’s workspace roots plus any enabled profile-defined workspace rootsYes:tmpdirThe $TMPDIR location, when one is available. only:slash_tmpThe /tmp folder, if it exists. only/absolute/pathA platform absolute path, such as /path on macOS/Linux/WSL or C:\path on native WindowsYes~/pathA path under the current user’s home directoryYes On native Windows, home-relative paths can also use backslashes, such as ~\work. Use :root only when a profile intentionally needs broad read coverage: [permissions.audit.filesystem] ":root" = "read" Use nested entries under :workspace_roots to scope access to workspace-root relative subpaths: [permissions.project-edit.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] "." = "write" # each workspace root "docs" = "read" # each workspace-root docs directory "generated" = "deny" # each workspace-root generated directory Nested subpaths must stay inside their workspace root. Parent traversal such as ../other-repo is rejected. Deny reads with exact paths or globs Use deny for files or subtrees that Codex should not read, even when a broader profile rule grants access nearby. Exact paths work well for stable locations such as ~/.ssh. Glob patterns work better when a profile needs to cover a family of sensitive files whose exact locations vary across repositories. When a glob sits under :workspace_roots, Codex interprets it relative to each effective workspace root. For example: [permissions.project-edit.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] "**/*.env" = "deny" This rule denies reads for matching .env files found beneath each runtime or profile-defined workspace root. Use it when you want to preserve normal workspace writes while keeping environment files, generated secrets, or similar credential-bearing files unreadable. deny glob patterns are supported as deny-read rules. read or write globs are less portable on Linux, WSL, and native Windows sandboxing, so prefer exact paths or subtree rules such as "docs/**" = "read" when possible. On Linux, WSL, and native Windows, an unbounded ** deny-read pattern may need bounded pre-expansion before the sandbox starts. Set glob_scan_max_depth when you use an unbounded pattern such as "**/*.env" = "deny": [permissions.project-edit.filesystem] glob_scan_max_depth = 3 [permissions.project-edit.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] "**/*.env" = "deny" glob_scan_max_depth must be at least 1. Higher values scan deeper before sandbox startup, which can add startup work on Linux, WSL, and native Windows. If you prefer not to use bounded expansion, enumerate explicit depths such as *.env, */*.env, and */*/*.env. Add reusable workspace roots to the profile when the same rules should apply to more than the current session root: [permissions.project-edit.workspace_roots] "~/code/app" = true "~/code/shared-lib" = true When this profile is active, Codex applies the :workspace_roots rules to the current session’s runtime workspace roots and to each enabled profile-defined workspace root. On native Windows, drive-letter paths such as D:\work and UNC paths such as \\server\share are supported as absolute paths. Set enabled = true to allow network access for the selected profile: [permissions.project-edit.network] enabled = true When network access is enabled, Codex uses full network behavior by default. Most profiles should also define domain rules: [permissions.project-edit.network.domains] "example.com" = "allow" # exact host "*.example.com" = "allow" # subdomains only "**.example.com" = "allow" # apex and subdomains "ads.example.com" = "deny" # deny wins over allow The network sandbox proxy binds to local listeners by default: [permissions.project-edit.network] enabled = true proxy_url = "http://127.0.0.1:3128" enable_socks5 = true socks_url = "http://127.0.0.1:8081" enable_socks5_udp = true Leave these listener settings at their defaults unless you are integrating with a specific runtime. The dangerously_* network keys are escape hatches for specialized environments and should not be used for ordinary local development. Local and private networks Codex applies a local/private-network guard by default as a defense against DNS rebinding and accidental access to local services. To intentionally allow a literal local target, allowlist the exact host or IP literal: [permissions.project-edit.network.domains] "localhost" = "allow" "127.0.0.1" = "allow" Set allow_local_binding = true only when the profile must reach allowlisted hostnames that resolve to local or private addresses: [permissions.project-edit.network] enabled = true allow_local_binding = true [permissions.project-edit.network.domains] "localhost" = "allow" Unix sockets Unix socket proxying is a local escape hatch for tools such as Docker. Use it sparingly: [permissions.project-edit.network.unix_sockets] "/var/run/docker.sock" = "allow" "/tmp/old.sock" = "deny" Use deny to reject a socket path, including an inherited allow entry. Denied socket paths are omitted from the effective allowlist. When Unix sockets are enabled, keep proxy listeners bound to loopback addresses. Permission profiles replace the older combination of sandbox_mode and sandbox_workspace_write when you want one reusable profile to describe both filesystem and network behavior. Use one system or the other for a session, not both. Suggested starting points: For a read-only workflow, use the built-in :read-only profile or define a custom profile with read access only where needed. For workspace editing, use the built-in :workspace profile or define a custom profile that writes through :workspace_roots and adds only the extra temp or cache paths the workflow needs. For unrestricted local execution, use :danger-full-access only when you intentionally want the broadest local access model. Profiles describe the local default posture for a session. Organization-managed requirements can still add restrictions that user configuration should not broaden. See Managed configuration for admin-enforced filesystem and network constraints. Permission profiles define the boundaries for local sandboxed command execution. Use them together with approval policies and the separate controls for other Codex surfaces. What profiles control Local command execution: Permission profiles govern sandboxed commands that run on your machine. App connectors, MCP servers, browser or computer-use surfaces, Codex cloud environment settings, and approved escalations use their own controls. Filesystem writes: A write-capable profile can create persistent changes. Treat writes to scripts, build steps, package manager hooks, shell startup files, and shared directories as sensitive because later tools or users can execute those files outside the original sandbox context. Outbound destinations: Network domain rules constrain where sandboxed command traffic can go through the network proxy. They do not determine whether an allowed destination is trustworthy, and wildcard allow rules stay broad. Local services: Local and private network targets are blocked by default. Allowlisting localhost, private IPs, Unix sockets, or setting allow_local_binding = true explicitly opens access to local services. How enforcement works On macOS, Codex uses Seatbelt sandbox profiles. If the selected policy cannot be enforced by the platform sandbox, Codex refuses to run the command instead of silently running it unsandboxed. On Linux and WSL, Codex uses bubblewrap and seccomp, with Landlock available for compatibility fallback paths. The strongest enforcement path depends on user namespaces and kernel support; restricted container hosts can force compatibility paths, and unsupported split policies are refused. On native Windows, elevated sandboxing is strongest because it can use dedicated lower-privilege sandbox users, filesystem permission boundaries, and firewall rules. unelevated sandboxing is a fallback with weaker network isolation and cannot enforce every split read/write carveout, so unsupported policies are refused. Use WSL when you need the Linux sandbox model. Operational guidance Choose the narrowest profile that still lets the task complete, especially when you grant writes or outbound network access. Keep approval policy, secret handling, and allow rules aligned with that access level. Read-only with network allowlist default_permissions = "readonly-net" [permissions.readonly-net.filesystem] ":minimal" = "read" [permissions.readonly-net.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] "." = "read" [permissions.readonly-net.network] enabled = true [permissions.readonly-net.network.domains] "api.openai.com" = "allow" File access limited to workspace Here is an example of a permission profile that will make your workspace folders writable by Codex while denying reads to the rest of the filesystem (with limited exceptions, as determined by :minimal). default_permissions = "workspace-only" [permissions.workspace-only] # By extending the :workspace profile, you get Codex's safeguards to ensure # subfolders such as .codex/ and .git/ within a workspace root are read-only # while the rest of the folder is writable. extends = ":workspace" [permissions.workspace-only.filesystem] # By default, deny read access to all files on disk. ":root" = "deny" # Though in practice, a software agent needs to be able to read folders that # contain common tools, such as `/usr/bin`, to get work done, so grant access # to a "minimal" set of files and folders, as determined by Codex. ":minimal" = "read" # By extending the :workspace profile, :tmpdir and :slash_tmp are "write" by # default, though you can deny access to them altogether, if desired. ":tmpdir" = "deny" ":slash_tmp" = "deny" Workspace write without network default_permissions = "project-edit" [permissions.project-edit.filesystem] ":minimal" = "read" [permissions.project-edit.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] "." = "write" [permissions.project-edit.network] enabled = false Workspace write with public web access default_permissions = "workspace-net" [permissions.workspace-net.filesystem] ":minimal" = "read" [permissions.workspace-net.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] "." = "write" [permissions.workspace-net.network] enabled = true [permissions.workspace-net.network.domains] "*" = "allow" Use the global "*" allow rule only when you intend to allow public network access. Deny rules can narrow a broad allowlist.